Counterterrorism combats terrorism through long-term, systematic opposition. This strategy counters violence with violence, and wages war on terrorist organizations by attempting to eliminate them. Counterterrorist strategy must incorporate both reactive and proactive measures to prove successful. In order to formulate such a strategy, we have turned to the game of chess as an instructive model.

Chess begins with two opponents and with clear goals. There is no elaborate program designed to reach that goal. Counterterrorism, on the other hand, begins as a statement of opposition, and as a reaction to a diverse number of terrorist groups. Counterterrorists do not merely fight one terrorist group, their ideal goal is to end the need for counterterrorism.

Yet, as is the case with chess, there is no clear, step-by-step program for reaching this goal. Given this similar problem, it is appropriate to apply strategies form the game of chess in order to achieve a direction for strategic counterterrorism. This strategy must consider that for each move the opponent has a potential counter-move which can absorb negative outcomes. Success in counterterrorism, just as in chess, will come as a result of exploring the subjective strengths of counterterrorist strategy.

In chess, the rules are defined, consistent and must be respected by both players in order to play the game. However, while counterterrorists are subjected to international and national laws, the terrorist, by definition, does not respect such parameters. In this sense, the constraints of the counterterrorists are defined, but the rules of the game are indeterminate. Therefore, the strategy of the counterterrorist must create a flexible position, able to respond to various situations. A terrorist will use whatever means are available to him, while the counterterrorist must abide by law.

The recent trend has been to make laws which facilitate successful counterterrorism. In legislative terms, this has meant the limitation or suspension of certain civil liberties in the name of fighting terrorism. For example, the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 includes a provision whereby the President of the United States may designate individual foreign bodies as terrorist organizations, thereby making it illegal to donate money to them. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. guarantees associational rights to all citizens with any group. The Omnibus Act, therefore, seems to limit the scope of the Fourth Amendment with respect to terrorism.

S. 735, another recent anti-terror law has legalized the roving multi-point wiretap. Such a device allows federal authorities to install microphones in each telephone used by a suspected terrorist. They are consequently able to gather information discussed by the suspect, not only on his own telephone, but on any other telephone he uses, i.e., that of his mother, brother, uncle, etc. Such legislation constitutes a significant infraction on privacy, both the suspect’s and the owners of the telephones he uses.

This recent trend represents what could be a very dangerous approach to fighting terrorism. The terrorist’s intention is to utilize ugly and repugnant means to achieve what is sometimes a morally acceptable end. Counterterrorism must fundamentally resist the sacrifice of means for ends. In light of this, is the recent legal trend of limiting freedoms as a means to fight terrorism ethical?

The inherent danger of this approach can be seen in its extreme form in the eruption of violence this summer in Capetown, South Africa. Since the establishment of the New Republic of South Africa, the outer-townships of Capetown have been controlled by gangs. In the old Republic of South Africa, the police were more or less free to use whatever means they chose to enforce law and order and the gangs were unable to control the area. For obvious reasons, the New Republic of South Africa has curbed the role of the police, enforced the protection of civil liberties, leaving gangs more room to operate.

As a reaction to this, the civilians of these areas, who are largely immigrant workers of middle-eastern origin, organized themselves into an organization called PAGAD: People Against Gangsterism and Drugs. In fighting the terrorism of these gangs, PAGAD has resorted to violence: killing terrorists, bombing their homes, and receiving military support from established terror organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This outbreak of violence has demonstrated the difficulties involved in respecting the strategic moral and aesthetic constraints of the means.

Terror activity involving hostages has represented a similar complex problem for decision makers. In the past, politicians have been advised to compromise with terrorists in order to negotiate the successful release of hostages. The advantage of this strategy is that it excludes the possibility of hostage deaths. However, such means imply a terrorist victory — encouraging terrorists to resort to further violence based on their previous successes.

Another approach entails the use of specially trained anti-terror squads. These squads violently break into the terrorists’ stronghold with the aim of neutralizing the terrorists and rescuing the hostages. Though this course of action risks the lives of the hostages and the anti-terrorists, it has been successfully implemented by the Israelis (1976) and by the French (1995). The Israeli special forces saved 103 hostages in a raid on the Entebbe Airport where they were being held captive. The Israeli commander and one citizen were killed. Similarly, a French anti-terror squad stormed an Air France jet in January of 1995, rescuing all of the hostages aboard. Only one French officer was injured.

Obviously, these examples represent the successful implementation of this strategy. Clearly, though, such an approach entails many risks. The means are elegant because they prevent the terrorists from achieving their goals, but the ends are potentially disastrous. When the ugly means of negotiations with terrorists are used, the hostages survive, but the terrorists win. As in chess, when crucial decisions must be made, the player relies on a pre-established and often intuitive weight function to help determine his move. An elaborate description of counterterrorism is therefore necessary to formalize the decision-making process.

The categories of formalization are: the function, the structure, the operational, the operator, and the genesis. The function of counterterrorism is to fight terrorism, to be distinguished from its ideal goal which is to end the need for counterterrorism. The structure of counterterrorism is the collection of special military response groups and policy makers.

The operational element involves political and military strategy. Such strategy must create a predisposition for success through a combination of military force, law, economic, political and military sanctions, and public education initiatives. Through these elements, as strategy will be able to absorb unexpected outcomes towards the benefit of counterterrorism. People must understand that if terrorism is to be defeated in the long-run, short-term negotiation tactics cannot be used.

There are two possible definitions of the operator. One possibility defines the operator as each individual government. The other option is that the operator defines a unified, international counterterrorist force. The former allows each country to determine its own subjective weight function and thus evaluate possible reactions themselves. No country defines terrorism in the same way, and each therefore emphasizes different parameters. Furthermore, as definitions are problematic, extraditions become rather difficult. A country which defines terrorism in one way, may refuse to extradite a suspect to a country which defines terrorism in another way.

The second possible definition of operator provides a completely universal, simultaneous attack launched against terrorism. In order to really fight terrorism, there must be a globally consistent policy with uniform definition, so that terrorists cannot simply abscond to a lenient country. Counterterrorism must be the project of the United Nations through international law and international convention. There must be one universal weight function determining the evaluation and consequent decision making in each situation. Terrorism does not observe borders, thus neither should counterterrorism.

Different aesthetic approaches inform the relevant discussion on decision making evaluation. Some countries respect the beauty of elegant means when solving complex problems. They understand that violating the strategic constraints of value-based means would be to hurt themselves in the long-run. Other countries are weak in the face of short-term pressure and crisis, and so respond differently. The United States has been guilty of short-term tactics, a mistake. Thus a formalized function based on the subjective contributions and evaluations of many countries must be unified into one policy.

The genesis of counterterrorism is terrorism. As long as terrorism continues to penetrate and disrupt the law and order of a society, that society must learn counterterrorist methods to defend itself against these attacks. We have examined the problem of means and concluded that in order to defeat terrorism in the long-run, counterterrorism must respect the beauty of the means. Even life-saving ends should not be achieved through ugly and compromising means. We have also applied the theory of flexibility in chess strategy to counterterrorist strategy. In this way, the game of chess has provided a valuable model for delineating the aesthetic values of counterterrorist strategic decision making.

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